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Abstract
Using a sample of security and privacy breaches the present research examines the comparative
announcement impact between the two types of events. The first part of the dissertation analyzes the
impact of publicly announced security and privacy breaches on abnormal stock returns, the change in
firm risk, and abnormal trading volume are measured. The second part of the dissertation analyzes
differential impact between security and privacy breaches on abnormal stock returns, the change in firm
risk, and abnormal trading volume are measured.
Using a sample of 114 security (65) and privacy (49) breaches on average, security breaches
resulted in more negative abnormal stock returns than do privacy breaches. While firm risk for privacy
events does not change appreciably, firms experiencing security events show a significant increase in
risk. The risk shifts between the security and privacy breaches is significantly different. Firms that
announced a security or privacy breaches experienced abnormal trading volume.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1.

Problem Statement
Information security is an important concern of corporations, and as such, it is an important

component of strategic management (von Solms, 2001). Market reactions to publicly announced security
and privacy breach incidents suffered by companies listed on US stock exchanges offers a mechanism to
capture both, tangible, and intangible financial losses. The most damaging types of attacks are,
according to the 2009 Computer Security Institute (CSI) survey on Computer Crime and Security,
wireless exploits, theft of personal identification and personal health information, and financial fraud
(Richardson, 2009). The losses from these attacks had an average cost per incident of $770,000,
$710,000, and $450,000, respectively (Richardson, 2009). Over sixty percent of the companies surveyed
by Verizon's Data Breach Investigations Report (2010) accounted for a privacy or a security breach.
According to a Congressional Research Service report (Cashell, Jackson, Jickling, & Webel, 2004) in
2003 losses due to worms and viruses are estimated at $13 billion, and for all other forms of attacks at
$225 billion. The market recognizes the prominence of security and privacy threats faced by
organizations which is reflected in a positive market reaction toward information security investments
(Chai, Kim, & Rao, 2011).
There have been few attempts to empirically assess the impact of information security
and privacy breaches. Many previous studies have, however, failed to adequately separate security and
privacy breaches. The results, as such, were confounding and mixed, at best. This study, therefore,
clearly distinguishes between privacy and security breach incidents. In the next Section, privacy and
security breaches are defined in more detail. Section 1.3 discusses the purposes of the present
dissertation. The Chapter concludes by providing an overview of the remaining Chapters.
1.2.

Information Security and Privacy Breaches
This dissertation research distinguishes, as stated earlier, between privacy and security breaches.

This Section explains in detail the criteria used to classify breaches in these two categories. As also
1

mentioned earlier, previous studies do not explicitly classify these breaches in well-defined categories.
Therefore, an important contribution of the present research is to clearly provide a definition of security
and privacy breaches. To draw the distinction between privacy and security breaches, research
conducted in the areas of privacy and security is cited. Privacy breaches are defined first, followed by a
definition of security incidents.
It should be noted that privacy breaches are defined from the perspective of firms. As such,
privacy breaches in the present dissertation are defined following the suggestions made by Straub
(1990). Straub (1990) investigated the impact of information systems security investments in providing
better control over computer abuse. The definition used in this dissertation for privacy breaches is an
incident resulting in unauthorized access and use of computer services, the purposeful interruption of
computer services, the theft or modification of computer codes, and the destruction of data (Straub,
1990).
According to the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) publication 199 by the
National Institute of Standards and Technology (2004) three levels (i.e. low, moderate, and high) of
potential impact on organizations or individuals suffering an information breach. As a result of a privacy
breach, a low level of potential impact is expected in the present research. The low level of potential
impact involves a degradation of in the firm's ability to perform its primary functions and the
"...effectiveness of the functions is noticeably reduced" (NIST, 2004, p. 2). The damage to organizational
assets and financial losses are minor.
In accordance with the precedent discussion, the present research classifies the following
incidents as privacy breaches:


Denial of service attacks (DoS)



Hacker attacks



Virus attacks, and



Website defacements.
Security breaches, on the other hand, are defined as any external, web-based act that results in

violations of NIST security elements such as identification, authentication, authorization, integrity, non2

repudiation, and confidentiality (Singhal, Winograd, & Scarfone, 2007). This definition of security is
also in agreement with the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, where
information security is defined as "preserving authorized restrictions on information access and
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary information... " (NIST, 2004,
p. 2). More specifically, the present research defines security incidents as those attacks that compromise
the confidentiality and integrity of customers' data and information assets.
Based on the FIPS publication 199 (2004), a security breach is classified in the present research
as a moderate level of potential impact. The moderate level of potential impact involves a significant
degradation of in the firm's ability to perform its primary functions and the "...effectiveness of the
functions is significantly reduced" (National Institute of Standards and Technology, 2004, p. 2). The
damage to organizational assets and financial losses are significant.
Based on the guidelines provided by Krishnamurthy and Wills (2010) and the FIPS publication
199 incidents involving the following items are classified as security breaches:


Social security numbers



Bank account numbers, and credit card numbers



Driver's license numbers



Identity theft, and



The exposure of any other personally identifiable information.
It is possible that a breach initiates in one area (i.e. security or privacy) and then affects the other

as well, which creates a challenge in its classification. For example, a virus may infect a system (i.e.
privacy breach) and then information regarding credit card information stored in the infected system is
compromised (i.e. security breach). In the event an incident transcends from one category to the other,
the breach is classified under the category it started in, as suggested by Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou (2011).
In the next Section, the purpose of the present dissertation research is discussed.
1.3.

Purpose
A recent stream of research has focused on privacy breaches (e.g., Acquisti, Friedman, & Telang,

2006; Campbell, Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou, 2003; Ettredge & Richardson, 2003; Hovav & D’Arcy, 2003;
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Ishiguro, Tanaka, Matsuura, & Murase, 2006; Nicholas-Donald, Matus, Ryu, & Mahmood, 2011), while
another stream has focused on security breaches (e.g. Andoh-Baidoo, Amoako-Gyampah, & OseiBryson, 2010; Andoh-Baidoo & Osei-Bryson, 2007; Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2004). None,
based on an extensive literature review, has focused on a comparative analysis of the impact of privacy
and security breaches. The present dissertation research is divided in three main themes. The first topic
is related to the market reaction of publicly announced privacy breaches. The second topic, aims to
address the market reaction of publicly announced security breaches. The third topic is a comparative
analysis of publicly announced privacy and security breaches. A more detailed discussion on these three
is provided next.
The objective of the present dissertation research is to provide a comparative study of market
reactions to publicly announced privacy breaches suffered by companies listed on the US Stock
exchanges. The comparison takes into consideration abnormal returns, shifts in risk, and abnormal
volume experienced by breached firms. These will be further discussed in Chapters 2 and 3.
1.4.

Overview of Remaining Chapters
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows: in Chapter 2, a literature review related to

event studies on information security breaches and privacy breaches, event studies on abnormal trading
volume changes, studies on risk shifts, and other relevant event studies on the area of information
systems are provided. In Chapter 3, the hypotheses development is presented. Chapter 4 introduces the
sample selected for the present research and research method. In Chapter 5 the results are put forward.
This is followed by Chapter 6, which discusses the results (Section 6.1), provides recommendations for
future research (Section 6.2), and concludes (Section 6.3) the present research.

4

Chapter 2: Literature Review
The findings, as stated earlier, from previous event studies in the area of information systems
privacy and security that examined abnormal returns are mixed. Some authors found statistically
significant negative abnormal returns due to privacy or security breaches, while others found no such
effects. In Section 2.1, the event study methodology is explained. This is followed by a review of the
literature in the information systems privacy area in Section 2.2. This is followed by a review of the
same in the security area in Section 2.3. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 cover event studies on abnormal trading
volume and risk shifts, respectively, conducted mostly in the accounting and finance areas. This is
because no research studies in the information systems area have explored these phenomena. An
exception is a recent study by Nicholas-Donald, Matus, Ryu, and Mahmood (2011), which offers
preliminary results in the area of information privacy breaches. Section 2.6 concludes the Chapter by
providing a summary of the literature review of other event studies in the information systems,
accounting, and finance areas.
2.1.

Event Study Methodology History and Application
Event-studies were developed in finance and accounting areas. An event study is a test of market

efficiency and expected rates of return (Kothari, 2001). The first event studies appeared in the 1960s and
have been since then an important and well-known methodology (Kothari, 2001). In this Section, a brief
history of event studies and its application is presented.
The first event study in financial economics was conducted by Fama et al. (1969). According to
Fama, an efficient market is one in which “security prices fully reflect all available information” (Fama,
1970, p. 383). Fama et al.'s work set the tone for researchers by introducing the analysis of the firm's
security price performance before, during, and after a specific event. In finance, for example, the
seminal articles of Fama et al. (1969) analyzed stock splits effect on stock returns. Ball and Brown
(1968) and Beaver (1968), also in the same area, investigated the impact of earnings announcements on
stock prices.

5

The event study methodology, in general, is based on the efficient market hypothesis, which is a
theoretically grounded and well-known concept in finance and accounting literatures. The event study
methodology relies on the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) to empirically test the efficient market
hypotheses. CAPM let to what today is known as asset pricing theory. This model is based on the work
of Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), Sharpe won the Nobel Prize in 1990 in recognition of his work on
CAPM. This model is widely used and well-known in business because it is powerful and intuitive, it
measures the relationship between expected return and risk (Fama & French, 2004). CAPM also builds
on the work of Markowitz (1959), who assumes investors are risk averse and select a portfolio that
maximizes the expected return and minimizes the risk. In this context, risk minimization is achieved by
selecting a “mean variance-efficient” portfolio, and at the same time by maximizing of the expected
return given the variance. In order to test the proposed hypotheses a market model based on CAPM is
used. Section 4.2 explains in more detail the test of the market efficiency theory using a market model
based on CAPM.
The present research follows the structure suggested by MacKinlay (1997) in designing an event
study methodology. According to MacKinlay (1997), an event study should be structured by following
these steps:


Define the event of interest (see Section 1.2),



Define the event window (see Section 4.2)



Determine the selection criteria for the inclusion of a firm in the sample (see Section 4.1)



Calculate abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns (see Section 4.4)

In the present research, an event constitutes a privacy or security breach incident suffered by a
public company listed on one of the United States stock markets. Second, the event window selected for
this research is based on the 3 trading days surrounding the event [-1, 0, +1]. This event window is
selected because the event announcement could be leaked a day before it reaches the news channels, or,
the announcement could be made public after trading hours (MacKinlay, 1997). The security or privacy
breaches identified should be inflicted to a publicly traded firm, and the market information should be
available in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) dataset. Expected returns are calculated
6

using an OLS regression (see Equation 1 in Section 4.2) using 250 trading days. Abnormal returns are
calculated, based on the difference from the expected returns and actual returns (see Equation 2 in
Section 4.2). In the present research, abnormal returns are calculated using two models, the one-factor
model (see Section 4.2) and the Fama-French's three-factor model (see Section 4.3). The abnormal
returns are cumulated during the event window. In other words, for each firm, the abnormal returns for
days -1, 0, and 1 are cumulated (see Equation 4 in Section 4.4).
2.2.

Event Studies in Information Systems Privacy Breaches
The results from the event studies in the information systems area, as stated earlier, are mixed.

Some studies found a statistically significant impact on a firm's value as a result of an information
systems privacy breach, while others did not. Three recent event studies on privacy breaches has been
reported in the US stock market by Hovav and D'Arcy (2003; 2004) and one in the Japanese stock
market by Ishiguro et al. (2006). These studies found no statistically significant impact on stock returns.
Five other studies, on the other hand, found a statistically significant negative impact on stock returns
(Acquisti et al., 2006; Campbell et al., 2003; Ettredge & Richardson, 2003; Khansa & Liginlal, 2011;
Nicholas-Donald et al., 2011). First a discussion of the “non-significant” group is put forward, followed
by the “significant” group. This is followed by a discussion of two relevant studies in privacy breaches.
The first research used an event study methodology to analyze the contagion effect of privacy breached
to non-breached competitors (Zafar, Ko, & Osei-Bryson, 2012), and the second study used a matched
sample approach to analyze the economic impact of privacy breaches (Ko & Dorantes, 2006).
Hovav and D’Arcy (2003), in the privacy group, conducted one of the first event studies on stock
market reaction to information privacy breaches (e.g., denial of service attacks) published in
newspapers. The authors used the market model, which is based on CAPM, to examine the stock market
reaction to 23 DoS attack announcements (i.e., events). The authors used 200 days estimation period and
five event windows (i.e. [-1, 0], [-1, 1], [-1, 5], [-1, 10], and [-1, 25]). Stock markets do not react, at least
according to the authors, negatively to privacy breach announcements.
In another study, Hovav and D'Arcy (2004) examined the impact of virus attack announcements
on the market value of breached firms. The authors scrutinized 186 virus attack announcements ranging
7

from 1998 to 2002. The authors do not provide any details on the model used to estimate returns or the
estimation window, other than mentioning the estimation of standardized abnormal returns. The authors
found no support for the hypothesis that virus announcements result in negative abnormal returns for all
five event periods (i.e. [0, 0], [0, 1], [0, 5], [0, 10], and [0, 25]) used by the authors. These results
support the notion that the impact of virus attack announcements does not have a significant negative
abnormal return for the breached firms.
Outside the United States, Ishiguro et al. (2006) conducted an event study to assess the impact of
information privacy breaches on stocks listed in the Japanese Stock market. Using a one factor market
model, a 120 days estimation period, and a seven-day event window, on a sample of 70 privacy
breaches, the authors also found no significant impact of privacy violations on the market value of the
breached companies listed on the Stock Exchange. The authors noted that the slow reaction to privacy
breaches is a common phenomenon in the Japanese market.
The previous three studies found no statistically significant negative market reactions due to
privacy breaches. Next, in this Section, the studies that found statistically significant impact of privacy
breaches on stock are discussed.
Acquisti et al. (2006) conducted an event study on privacy breaches of 79 companies with an
estimation window of 92 days and an event window of 18 days [-7, 10]. Using the market model, the
market adjusted model, and the mean adjusted model the authors found a negative and statistically
significant impact of breach attacks published in newspapers on stock market returns of breached
companies. On the event day and the day after the event day, the cumulative abnormal returns reached
6% and these returns are, according to the authors, robust under different model specifications. Overall,
the authors found that publicly announced privacy breaches resulted in a significant negative market
return for the breach firms.
An early attempt in the area of privacy breaches was put forward by Campbell et al. (2003). The
authors found negative and statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns on the stock prices of
the breached companies. Using the market model on a sample of 43 privacy breach events published in
major national newspapers, an estimation period of 120 days, and an event window of 3-days (-1,0,+1),
8

the authors assessed the market reaction to the aforementioned privacy breach announcements. The
authors contribute to the area of privacy breaches by finding that there is a negative and statistically
significant cumulative abnormal return for the breached firms.
Ettredge and Richardson (2003) undertook a different approach and measured the information
transfer among Internet firms. The authors analyzed the popular DoS attacks carried in February 2000
and extended the current research area by also exploring the spillover effect of non-breached firms on
“similar” firms. The authors employed a single-index market model with a 255-day estimation period
and a three-day event window for the total of 275 non-breached firms. The authors found information
transfer (in the form of negative mean abnormal returns) among firms within the industries of the
breached firms. Firm size was found to be another factor in information transfer, where larger firms are
found to be more likely to be the targets of attacks.
Khansa and Liginlal (2011) predicted stock market returns from malicious attacks and how these
attacks caused a spillover effect on security services firms. The authors found that security services
firms were influenced positively by the announcement of virus attacks. The authors also found that there
was a negative impact on stock prices of the breached firms. The sample of events consisted of around
11,000 privacy breaches announced in Symantec's website. The estimation of stock market returns was
obtained with a vector autoregressive and time-delayed neural networks.
In a recent study by Nicholas-Donald et al. (2011), the authors found support for the hypothesis
that privacy breaches result in a significant and negative abnormal return. The study relied on a sample
of 29 privacy breaches from the time period of 2000 to 2010. The authors estimated abnormal returns
using a single-index market model with 250 trading days for the estimation window, and a three-day
event window [-1, +1]. In addition to finding support of a significant and negative impact of privacy
breaches on abnormal returns, the authors also analyzed the impact on trading volume and risk (as
measured by beta).
A recent study by Zafar, Ko, and Osei-Bryson (2012) investigated the effect of privacy breaches
on breached firms and the contagion effect on their non-breached competitors. The authors defined a
breach a result of a website defacement, denial-of-service attack, data theft, and data corruption. Using a
9

sample of 119 breached firms and 867 non-breached competitors, the authors found evidence of a
contagion effect. The authors found statistically significant evidence of an intra-industry information
transfer from the breached firms to non-breached firms for website defacement, data theft, and data
corruption. This effect was not present for denial-of-service attacks.
Breaking ranks with the previous studies that used an event study, Ko and Dorantes (2006)
utilized a matched sample comparative analysis to investigate the impact of privacy breaches (e.g., virus
attacks, unauthorized access, theft of proprietary information, denial of service attacks, sabotage, and
web site defacement) on the performance of publicly traded companies. In order to determine whether
there were any significant differences between the treatment group (that includes firms that have
experienced information privacy breaches) and control group (that includes non-breached companies
that match the treatment sample by size and industry), the authors took a matched sample approach that
used a t-test and a non-parametric test comparing total assets, number of employees, and annual sales.
Overall, no significant differences were found between the publicly traded breached firms and the nonbreached firms.
In the aforementioned Section, the event studies in information systems privacy breaches were
discussed. The following Section in this chapter discusses the event studies on information systems
security breaches.
2.3.

Event Studies in Information Systems Security Breaches
In the security area, the results from the event studies are also mixed. Some studies found a

statistically significant impact on firm value as a result of information systems security breaches, while
others did not. More specifically, two event studies found no statistically significant impact of security
breaches on stock returns (e.g., Bolster, Pantalone, & Trahan, 2010; Kannan, Rees, & Sridhar, 2007),
while a number of studies found a statistically significant impact of security breaches on abnormal
returns (e.g. (Bose & Leung, 2008; Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Chen, Bose, Leung, & Guo, 2011; Garg,
Curtis, & Halper, 2003a, 2003b; Gatzlaff & McCullough, 2010; Goel & Shawky, 2009; Gordon et al.,
2011; Malhotra & Malhotra, 2011; Morse, Raval, & Wingender, 2011)). The following Section discusses
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the aforementioned studies. First, a discussion of the “non-significant’’ group is put forward, followed
by the “significant” group.
Bolster et al. (2010), for example, conducted an event study that combines both privacy and
security breaches on a sample of 93 firms. The authors used the market model in order to estimate
abnormal returns. Using event windows of (-1, 0), (-1, 0, +1), and (1, 30), and an estimation window of 301 to -46, overall the authors found no statistically significant effect of security and privacy breaches
on stock market returns of these companies. Interestingly, even the CARs of stolen data and the loss of
social security numbers were not statistically significant. Although the negative abnormal returns are not
significant, the authors estimated that the average loss due to a publicly announced breach is around
$300 million.
Kannan et al. (2007) conducted an event study on the market reaction to overall impact of
information security breaches. Using the CARs computed over 3-day, 8-day, and 30-day event windows,
the authors found that none of the CARs are significant. The market reaction to security breaches was
further investigated by analyzing the firm size, the type of attack, and the characteristic of the period of
attack. Interestingly, the market reactions to confidentiality breaching attacks which are characterized as
theft of credit card numbers, source codes, and unauthorized access to websites did not bring in negative
abnormal returns. The authors conceded the lack of abnormalities could be due to aggregation of the
data of all types of attacks.
The previous two research efforts found that security breaches had no negative and significant
impact on stock market value. The research articles discussed next found negative and significant impact
on stock market value of security breached firms.
Bose and Leung (2008) conducted an event study on the effect of phishing, online identity theft,
announcements on the market value of breached firms. The authors used CAPM to calculate abnormal
returns, standardized abnormal returns (SAR), and cumulative standardized abnormal returns (CSAR)
on a sample of 2994 phishing attacks derived from publicly available news repositories (e.g.,
Millersmiles, Hong Kong Monetary Authority, and Malaysia Computer Emergency response team). The
authors further used an event window of 3 days [-1, 1] and an estimation window of 200 trading days [11

230, -31]. Overall, the authors found significant and negative effects of phishing announcements on
stock returns. Further, the authors noticed that among all the companies investigated, holding companies
had the highest CSAR value of -7.3 and subsidiaries had the lowest but significant CSAR value of -3.4.
Cavusoglu et al. (2004) assessed the effect of security breach announcements on the market
value of 78 firms. The authors also investigated the effect of these breaches on the market value of
security apparatus developing firms. In order to calculate the abnormal returns, the authors used the
market model with an estimation window of 160 days ([-160, -1]) and an event window of two days ([0,
1]). The authors found that security breach announcements in general are negatively associated with
abnormal stock returns of the breached firms. Furthermore, this association is stronger for the net firms
than for the conventional firms and, in particular, there is a positive association between these
announcements and the abnormal returns of the security developing firms.
Chen, Bose, Leung, and Guo (2011) found a negative and significant impact as a result of
phishing attacks (a form of security breach). The authors estimated abnormal returns using a singlefactor market model, with an estimation window of 200 trading days and an event window of 3 days
surrounding the event. Chen et al. investigated the severity of the security breaches with a numerical
experimentation using a 3 x 3 x 2 experimental design. The experimental design consisted of three sets
of input data, three classifiers, and two classification tasks. As outputs, the authors used CAR and Risk
Level (as per the classification by Millersmiles). The Millersmiles database is a repository of phishing
and spam emails. The authors found that there is no clear relationship between a high risk attack and
CAR.
Garg et al. (2003a) used an event study to compare the impact of both privacy (e.g., denial of
service attacks) and security (e.g., theft of credit card information) breaches on stock market returns of
some publicly traded breached companies. Using a sample of 22 events, an estimation window of a year
worth of trading days immediately preceding the day of the event, and 3 event windows of [0], [0, +1],
and [0, +2], the authors found a negative 9.3% abnormal returns on the day of the attack increasing to a
negative 14.9% abnormal returns on the second day after the attack. Interestingly, the authors found no
significant abnormal returns for the privacy breach attacks on Microsoft. In a similar study by the same
12

authors in (2003b), using a homogeneous sample of 22 events, negative and significant abnormal returns
due to the privacy breaches was observed.
Gatzlaff and McCullough (2010) performed an event study for analyzing the impact of data
breaches on shareholder wealth. The authors calculated expected returns using a one-factor market
model with a 245 estimation period and several event periods, ranging from -5 to 180 days relative to
the event day. The sample consisted of 77 data breaches suffered by firms from the period of 2004 to
2006. Overall, the authors found evidence of a negative and significant impact on shareholder wealth as
a result of a data breach. The authors supported the notion that firms that are less forthcoming about the
details of the data breach are penalized the most. Other important findings lie in the role of the firm size
and the subsidiary status in mitigating the negative effects, and that the significance of the negative
effect on shareholder wealth is more prominent for the most recent events.
Goel and Shawky (2009) also put forward a study combining both, security and privacy breaches
(e.g. malicious code, stolen hardware, and insider attack). The authors used a single-index market model
and Fama-French's three-factor model with a sample of 168 events over the period of 2004-2008. The
estimation windows consisted of 255 days with an event window of [-119, 10]. The authors found that
security breach announcements are associated with 1% negative and significant abnormal returns during
the days surrounding the event day.
A recent research effort by Gordon et al. (2011) classified security incidents in three categories
(i.e. confidentiality, integrity, and availability) and used these as one holistic category that included all
three sub-categories. The events collected by the authors are from the time period of 1995 to 2007,
excluding incidents from 121 trading days after 9/11. The authors excluded these events due to the high
market volatility with the potential to introduce bias in the analysis. The final sample is composed of
121 events. The authors employed the traditional single-index model and Fama-French's three-factor to
estimate expected returns. For both models the estimation window consisted of 121 days and 3 days for
the event window ([-1, 1]). The authors found that security breaches, as a generic category (e.g.
confidentiality, integrity, and availability), had a negative and significant impact on firm's market returns
An interesting finding of the study is that, when the breaches were tested as a single category, the
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authors found a statistically significant negative impact on abnormal returns, the same result was found
for the availability sub-category. Breaches threatening confidentiality or integrity, however, were found
to be not statistically significant.
Malhotra and Malhotra (2011) investigated the effect of customer information breaches as
service failures using an event study methodology. The authors found evidence of a short and long-term
decline in the market value of breached firms. This relationship is positively related with the magnitude
of the breach, as measured by the number of customers' data breached. The authors employed a singlefactor model and a four-factor model (introduced by (Carhart, 1997), with a sample of 93 events post
year 2000. The estimation period for both models was 200 trading days and the authors used multiple
event windows to provide detail in both the short and the long-term horizons.
Morse, Raval, and Wingender (2011) found a negative and statistically significant impact on
stock returns as a result of security breaches. The financial industry suffered the greater consequences in
negative abnormal returns across the different industries studied in the present research. The sample
consisted of 306 events ranging from the time period of 2000 to 2010. The sample was furthermore
divided into three categories based on the nature of the attack, these categories were stolen laptops
(n=88), fraudulent access (n=43), and hacking (n=34). The abnormal returns were calculated using a
single-factor model with an estimation window of 255 trading days, and an event window of 2 days.
The mixed findings in the area of information systems security breaches could be as a result of a
number of factors. As previously mentioned, one factor is the lack of a clear definition of what
constitutes a security or privacy breach. Another factor is that different studies used different estimation
windows and event windows. Third, the sample sizes varied significantly in size, which could also affect
the validity of the findings.
2.4.

Event Studies in Abnormal Trading Volume Changes
In the information systems area, only one event study analyzed the effect on abnormal trading

volume due to privacy breaches (Nicholas-Donald et al., 2011). This Section of the literature review, as
such, relies mostly on the work done in the finance and accounting areas. A number of studies in these
areas investigated whether an event had caused abnormal trading volume. In the area of finance and
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accounting, abnormal trading volume was investigated in the context of capital gains tax rate reduction
(Bali & Francis, 2010), around earnings announcements (Bamber, Barron, & Stevens, 2010; Frazzini &
Lamont, 2007; Hope, Thomas, & Winterbotham, 2009), when stocks are added to a market index
(Biktimirov, Cowan, & Jordan, 2004), on-line stock search intensity (Joseph, Babajide Wintoki, &
Zhang, 2011), and national elections (Bialkowski, Gottschalk, & Wisniewski, 2008). This Section
concludes with a discussion on the research put forward by Karafiath (2009). The author validated the
use of ordinary least squares in estimating abnormal trading volume. The aforementioned studies are
discussed next.
Nicholas-Donald et al. (2011) analyzed the effect of privacy breaches on abnormal trading
volume. The authors used a sample of 29 privacy breaches. The abnormal volume was calculated based
on the work of Yadav (1992), where abnormal trading volume is calculated by comparing the volume
during the event-window [-1, 1] and post event trading volume (60 trading days). The authors found that
trading volume decreased in the post-event period compared to the volume in the event-window. The
significance of this change was not provided in the preliminary results.
Bali and Francis (2010) investigated the reaction in ex-day trading volume resulting from capital
gains tax rate reduction from 28% to 20%. The final sample consisted of 18,358 numbers of
observations. The abnormal trading volume was estimated using the following procedure: first, an
average of the trading volume over 80 trading days ([-45, -6], [6, 45]) relative to the ex-day (day [0])
was calculated. The standardized excess volume (SEV) was then computed by scaling the excess volume
for each of the 11 days surrounding the event [-5, 5]. Finally, the cumulative standardized excess volume
(CSEV) was computed by aggregating all SEVs. The authors divided the events into high-yield and lowyield groups in the pre and post event periods, respectively. The authors found, for both events, the
abnormal trading volume in the days around the event. The CSEV felt by about 26% in the days after the
event.
On average, stock prices rise around the scheduled earnings announcement dates. Bamber,
Baron, and Stevens (2010) show that earning announcements premium is large, robust, and related to
volume surges around the announcement dates. They also found that stocks with the high past
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announcement period volume earn the high announcement premium. This suggests that there is a
common underlying cause for both the volume and the premium surge. The authors found that this
premium surge is related to buying by small investors.
As stated earlier, it is well-known that, on average, stock prices rise around the scheduled
earnings announcement dates. Frazzini and Lamont (2007) found that the magnitude of premium around
earning announcements is between 7% and 18% per year and is not confined to the 3-day window
around the announcement day. They show that this predictable rise in stock prices is driven by a
predictable rise in abnormal volume around the earning announcement day. They also show that stocks
with high past volume earn the high premium and high volume. They further show that this high volume
is driven by buying by small investors.
Hope, Thomas, and Winterbotham (2009) examined the impact of geographic earnings
disclosures and trading volume. Geographic earning disclosure is defined as a multinational firm
disclosing in their annual report the allocation of earnings in terms of geographical dispersion. Using a
sample of disclosing and non-disclosing geographic earnings by firms with significant foreign
operations, the authors find a relationship between the decrease in trading volume and non-disclosure of
geographic earnings.
Biktimirov, Cowan, and Jordan (2004), investigated as to whether the firms added to or deleted
from the small cap Russell 2000 index go through similar changes in returns and trading volume. This
study is interesting because the Russell 2000 has a number of advantages over the S&P 500 on the effect
of index membership. Some of these advantages are that the additions to the Russell 2000 occur on a
regular annual basis, the S&P 500 additions occur irregularly. The Russell 2000, also has more additions
than the S&P 500, resulting a larger sample size to be used for the analysis. Using an estimation period
of 200 days ([-479, -280]) before the reconstitution day and 81 event days centered on the reconstitution
day on large samples of pure additions and pure deletions, Biktimirov et al. (2004) found a clear and
significant evidence of a high abnormal volume for both sets during the reconstitution day.
Joseph, Wintoki, and Zhang (2011) examined the effect of online search intensity on abnormal
stock returns and trading volume. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms for the time period of 2005-2008,
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the authors found evidence that the search intensity predicts abnormal returns and trading volumes. An
interesting finding is that the sensitivity to search intensity is lowest for easy to arbitrage, low volatility
stocks and higher for difficult to arbitrage, high volatility stocks. The authors shed light on our
understanding of the impact of real-time information provided by online searches in abnormal returns
and trading volume.
In an interesting twist, Bialkowski, Gottschalk, and Wisniewski (2008) investigated whether
politics can influence finance by focusing on the impact of national elections on stock market volatility.
Using an event study with a one day event window which is either the Election Day or the first trading
day after the election, the authors found a strong abnormal rise in volatility on the Election Day. This
country-specific return volatility stayed high for a number of days after the election based on the fact
that final election results may not be available for those days and could easily double in the week around
elections.
In an effort to validate the extent research in the areas of accounting and finance examining the
abnormal trading volume due to new information, Karafiath (2009) offered several alternative tests
statistics as an alternative to the popular single-index market model. The authors relied in simulations of
random sample of securities collected from CRSP. The authors concluded that using generalized least
squares with first and second order auto-regressive structures does not have a significant impact on
improvement from ordinary least squares regression (OLS). The authors, therefore, validated the
calculation of abnormal trading volume using the traditional single-index market model using OLS.
In the aforementioned Section, the studies investigating abnormal trading in the areas of
information systems, finance and accounting were discussed. In the following Section, the literature in
risk shifts is discussed for the same areas.
2.5.

Risk Shifts
With exception of research studies conducted by Nicholas-Donald et al. (2011), no other studies

in the information systems area have conducted an analysis of risk shifts as a result of privacy breaches.
The authors used a sample of 29 privacy breaches. The risk shifts was calculated based on the work of
Yun and Kim (2010), where risk shift is measured by comparing the betas before the event-window and
17

post event betas (250 trading days on each time period). The authors found an increase in betas,
indicative of increased risk, from the pre-event to the post-event periods. The statistical significance of
this change was not provided in the preliminary results.
In the finance and accounting literatures risks shifts as a result of an event have been explored
extensively. In the finance literature a couple of research studies, for example, examined how the
inclusion in the S&P 500 index affected firm risk (e.g. (Barberis, Shleifer, & Wurgler, 2005; Patton &
Verardo, 2009)). In a similar vein, Yun and Kim (2010) analyzed the risk shift of firms as a result of
being included in the KOSPI 200 index. Kleidt and Schiereck (2009), on the other hand, examined the
impact of an issuance of convertible debt on systematic equity risk. These studies are discussed next.
Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) analyzed additions to the S&P 500 in order to compare
the two views of return comovement: traditional, which means attributing comovement in news about
fundamental value and an alternative view, that means delinking from fundamentals. The data was
collected from S&P 500 index inclusions over the period of September 22, 1976 and December 31,
2000. The sample consisted of 455 inclusions in daily and weekly data, and 324 in monthly data. In
order to test their predictions, the authors first ran univariate regressions, one prior to the inclusion (or
deletion) of a stock into the S&P 500 index and one after. Comovement from these two univariate
regressions was analyzed in order to test for friction or sentiment-based views. The authors found that
after the inclusion in the S&P 500 index, a stock's beta increases. Using a bi-variate regression which
controls for the return of non-S&P 500 stocks, the increase in risk (as measured by beta) is even larger.
They used the bi-variate regression test to compare and contrast the traditional view from the alternative
view. These results were stronger because the authors used a bi-variate regression methodology.
Patton and Verardo (2009) analyzed the beta on days of firm-specific news announcements. The
sample consisted of all stocks included in the S&P 500 index during January 1995 and December 2006,
resulting in a sample of 810 companies. The events analyzed by the authors are the earning
announcements of these companies during the aforementioned time period. In order to estimate for
changes in betas the authors used a panel regression approach across the entire sample of stocks. The
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authors found evidence of a statistically significant change in systematic risk due to firm-specific news,
this change reverts to a normal levels after two to five days after the announcement.
Yun and Kim (2010) examined the effect of inclusions or deletions of stocks in the KOSPI 200
index. In order to analyze the impact of the changes in the KOSPI 200 index, volatility and beta changes
were examined. The KOSPI 200 index changes started in June 1995 and extends to June 2008, during
this time period, the authors identified 2777 regular changes of stocks in the index. The sample was
divided in two subsets; one corresponds to events from 1995 to 2001 and the second group from 2002 to
2008. The authors calculated abnormal returns using a one-factor market model and a Fama-French's
three-factor model. In calculating the volume patterns, the authors used the mean relative dollar volume
ratio. This ratio “...measures each day's relative dollar volume ratio to each stock's past dollar volume to
market” (Yun & Kim, 2010, p. 261). In order to test for beta changes, the authors adopted the
methodology suggested by Barberis et al. (2005) (i.e. a univariate model). The authors found evidence of
abnormal trading activity due to changes in the KOSPI 200 index and a statistically significant increase
in daily betas.
Kleidt and Schiereck (2009), as stated earlier, examined the impact of issuance of convertible
debt on systematic equity risk. A convertible debt is a type of debt that could be converted for another
type of security. The authors found evidence that the issue of convertible debt impose a significant
increase in systematic risk. The data consisted of convertible debt issues (CD) and seasoned equity
offerings (SEO) from the time period of January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2002 from companies traded
in the US. In order to estimate systematic equity risk, the authors used a standard one-factor market
model with an estimation window of 250 trading days.
In the aforementioned Section, the studies investigating the impact of a number of events on risk
shifts were discussed. In the following Section, a discussion of other event studies in the areas of
information systems, accounting, and finance are discussed.
2.6.

Other Relevant Event Studies in Information Systems, Accounting, and Finance
Within the area of information systems, a number of studies have been identified that are

relevant to the present research (e.g. (Bharadwaj, Keil, & Mähring, 2009; Hovav, Andoh-Baidoo, &
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Dhillion, 2007; Hovav & D’Arcy, 2005; Telang & Wattal, 2007). In the finance area, Gillet, Hübner, and
Plunus (2010) operationalazed the losses from reputational damage as a result of operational losses
reported by financial companies. The following studies employed an event study methodology and the
events analyzed are similar to security and privacy breaches (e.g. defective IT products, IT failures, and
software vulnerabilities). The similarity draws upon the expected negative impact of the event on the
firm's returns. These studies are discussed next.
Bharadwaj, Keil, and Mähring (2009) used a combination of an event study methodology and the
resource-based view of the firm theory to analyze the impact of IT failures on the firm value. The
authors used a sample of 213 IT failures during the time period of 1990 to 2000. The authors utilized the
one-factor market model with an estimation period of 120 trading days ([-120, -2]) and 2-day event
window ([-1, 0]). They found support for the hypothesis that IT failures lead to abnormal returns (around
2% on average). The authors also found that the severity of the IT failure is positively correlated with
negative abnormal returns. Another interesting finding of the study is that those firms with a previously
reported IT failure experience a greater impact on negative abnormal returns.
Hovav, Andoh-Baidoo, & Dhillion (2007) analyzed the impact of security breaches on stock
returns. The focus of the research was to evaluate whether the attacker type, attacker's objective, the
results of the attack, the attack tools, and access types had played a role in determining the magnitude of
the impact on stock returns. The authors found evidence that the different attack characteristics have an
impact on the magnitude of abnormal returns. The authors also found that breaches resulting in the
disclosure of private information had a significantly larger effect on the market reaction.
Hovav and D'Arcy (2005) studied the effect of defective IT products on the market value of the
firm. The focus is on whether the market penalizes firms producing substandard IT products. In the
study, the authors considered substandard products are those flawed and blamed for the increase of
computer viruses. The sample consisted of 92 events over the period of 1988 to 2002. In order to
estimate normal returns the authors used a single-index market model with an estimation window of 200
daily returns, and five different event windows ([0], [0,1], [0,5], [0,10] and [0,25]). The authors found
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that IT vendors are penalized by the market only for distributing software with embedded viruses, as
opposed to those facilitating the spreading of computer viruses using other means.
Telang and Wattal (2007) investigated the impact of software vulnerability announcements on a
firm's stock price. The authors compiled a sample of 147 vulnerability announcements between 1999
and 2004. In this study, the authors used three models in order to estimate expected returns: marketadjusted model, mean-adjusted model, and mean model. The estimation period consisted of 160 trading
days and the event window consisted of only one day ([0]).

The results suggest that software

vulnerability disclosures have a negative and significant impact on the stock performance of vendors.
The negative impact on the stock performance was found to be positively correlated with the severity of
the vulnerability.
Gillet, Hübner, and Plunus (2010) attempted to operationalize the losses from reputational
damage as a result of operational losses reported by financial companies. Using a sample of 154 events
occurred between 1990 and 2004 on major European and US Stock Exchanges; the authors found
significant and negative abnormal returns on the announcement date of the operational loss. The authors
used a 250 trading days for the estimation window and a one-factor market model to estimate abnormal
returns. The authors found that the financial companies had experienced a 7% decrease in cumulative
abnormal returns and 4% decrease in CAR due to Clients Products and Business Practices (CPBP).
In summary the research on the impact of security and privacy breaches, as can be seen from the
aforementioned discussion of relevant research studies, are not conclusive and comprehensive. The
objective of the present dissertation is three-fold: first, to avoid confounding the impact of privacy and
security breaches, the present research divides the security and privacy breaches into two clear cut
categories based on the well-established definitions of these breaches and analyze the data accordingly.
No research studies, at least in the information systems area, have done so. Second, in addition to using
abnormal stock market returns, the present research employs abnormal risk and abnormal trading
volume to systematically and conclusively analyze the impact of privacy and security breach
announcements into two clearly defined categories. No research studies in the information systems area
have conducted a comprehensive privacy or security breach study. Third, the present research is the first
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attempt in conducting a comprehensive and comparative study on the security and privacy categories.
This is done using abnormal stock market returns, risk, and treading volume.
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Chapter 3: Hypotheses Development
All hypotheses included in the present dissertation are grounded in theory and in previous
research. The general theme of the hypotheses in the present research is that the impact from security
breaches is more serious than privacy breaches in terms of abnormal returns, volume, and risk measures
for a number of reasons. First, the consequences of stealing social security numbers, bank account
numbers, credit card numbers, and driver’s license numbers are expected be more serious than those for
denial of service attacks, hacker attacks, virus attacks, and website defacements. This is due in part, to
the potential for law suits and decreased credibility from security attacks. Second, security breaches
require breaking through firewalls and other intrusion prevention and detection systems, which means
that investors are expected to treat these breaches as more serious and they are more likely to punish the
companies by perhaps selling their stocks.
The rest of this Chapter is divided into three Sections. First, Section 3.1 constitutes an analysis of
publicly announced privacy and security breaches, each analyzed individually. This is followed by
Section 3.2 that deals with the comparative analysis of publicly announced privacy and security
breaches.
3.1.

Analysis of Publicly Announced Privacy and Security Breaches
In this Section, the impact of privacy and security breaches are analyzed independently. The

theme of the hypotheses in this Section is tested by security and privacy breaches groups. Upon analyses
of these breaches as separate categories, these will be compared and contrasted against each other with a
set of hypotheses put forward in Section 3.2 below.
The Efficient Market Hypothesis posits that all publicly available information is absorbed in a
stock's price. The public announcement of an information system privacy or information system security
breach, in general, is expected to have a negative impact on the stock of the breached firm. In the present
dissertation research, the publicly announced information privacy or security breach on a publicly traded
company is expected to have a negative impact on three aspects. First, it will result in negative abnormal
returns. Second, it is expected to result in abnormal trading volume. Third and lastly, there is an
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expectation of increased risk shifts surrounding the breach. In the information systems literature, as
previously discussed, the findings suggests that there is no consensus on whether a privacy or security
breach leads to negative abnormal returns (see Chapter 2). Some studies have found a negative and
significant abnormal returns due to privacy (Acquisti et al., 2006; Campbell et al., 2003; Ettredge &
Richardson, 2003; Khansa & Liginlal, 2011; Nicholas-Donald et al., 2011) or security (Bose & Leung,
2008; Cavusoglu et al., 2004; Chen et al., 2011; Garg et al., 2003a, 2003b; Gatzlaff & McCullough,
2010; Goel & Shawky, 2009; Gordon et al., 2011; Malhotra & Malhotra, 2011; Morse et al., 2011)
breaches.
Therefore, based in the previous discussion, the following hypotheses are put forward:
H1a: A clearly defined information privacy breach will have a significant negative impact on the
stock market value of the firm when such a breach becomes public.
H1b: A clearly defined information security breach will have a significant negative impact on
the stock market value of the firm when such a breach becomes public.
An important factor an investor evaluates while making an investment decision is the level of
risk associated in the underlying asset. The beta coefficients in the CAPM provide an estimate that
represents the stock’s volatility in relation to the overall stock market. This beta is a proxy of risk. In the
present research, a firm's risk is expected to increase as a result of a privacy or a security breach. In this
capacity, only one forthcoming research has performed a risk shift as a result of a security breach
(Cardenas, Coronado, Nicholas-Donald, Parra, & Mahmood, 2012) and one in the privacy area
(Nicholas-Donald et al., 2011). Nicholas-Donald et al. (2011) found that the betas for publicly traded
firms incurred in an increase of its betas after a publicly announced privacy breach.
Based on the aforementioned discussion, the following hypotheses are put forward:
H2a: A clearly defined information privacy breach will result in a significant increase in firm's
risk as measured by its betas when such a breach becomes public.
H2b: A clearly defined information security breach will result in a significant increase in firm's
risk as measured by its betas when such a breach becomes public.
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An additional analysis, that in combination with abnormal returns provides a more detailed view
of the market behavior, is that of abnormal trading volume. Past research have suggested that abnormal
trading volume is present surrounding earnings announcements (Bamber et al., 2010; Frazzini &
Lamont, 2007; Garfinkel & Sokobin, 2006), surrounding capital gains tax rate reductions (Bali &
Francis, 2010), when stocks are added to a market index (Bialkowski et al., 2008), and as a result of a
privacy breach (Nicholas-Donald et al., 2011). As in abnormal returns and risk shifts, no research study
in the information systems area measures abnormal trading volume due to publicly announced security
breaches. Therefore, an emphasis in the accounting and finance areas in order to put forward hypotheses
related to abnormal trading volume were cited. An exception, in the information systems security area, is
the study of Nicholas-Donald (2011). In this study, the authors investigated the abnormal trading volume
due to a privacy area. In the research by Nicholas-Donald et al. (2011) firms suffering a privacy breach
suffer post-event abnormal trading volume. The authors, however, did not conduct a test to assess if this
change is statistically significant. In the finance area, for example, Yun and Kim (2010) investigated the
effect on trading volume as a result of changes in the KOSPI 200 Index composition. The authors found
that when a firm's stock is added to the KOSPI Index, firm's trading volume increases significantly
during the event period and stays high even after the event has taken place. Similarly, abnormal trading
volume is observed for firms that have been deleted from the Index.
The discussion above lead to the following hypotheses:
H3a: A clearly defined information privacy breach will result in a firm's significant abnormal
trading volume when such a breach becomes public.
H3b: A clearly defined information security breach will result in a firm's significant abnormal
trading volume when such a breach becomes public.
This Section put forward a set of hypotheses in order to test the abnormal returns, abnormal
trading volume, and risk shifts due to privacy or security breaches. These hypotheses are tested for each
of the two types of breaches in separate groups. The following Sections puts forward a group of
hypotheses aimed to make a comparative analysis between the privacy and security breaches. This will
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shed light on how the two breaches compare and contrast in terms of the abnormal returns, abnormal
trading volumes, and abnormal risks.
3.2.

Comparative Analysis of Publicly Announced Privacy and Security Breaches
In this Section, the present research now provides rationale and literature support for each of the

hypotheses in what follows. It is expected that due to the nature of the breached assets, security incidents
will result on higher negative abnormal returns. Farahmand, Navathe, Sharp, and Enslow (2004) found
evidence that the degree of confidential data and the impact in the market value of firms are related.
Garg et al. (2003a; 2003c) also found evidence that confidentiality breaches, related to credit card
information, are the types of breaches with the highest negative impact in the market value of the
breached firms. Campbell et al. (2003) found evidence of a negative and significant relationship between
confidentiality related breaches and firm market value, and non-significant for non-confidentiality
breaches. Bose and Leung (2008) found that phishing attacks, a type of security breach, resulted in a
negative and significant impact on abnormal returns. Hovav and Andoh-Baidoo (2007) found that
breaches resulting in the disclosure of private information resulted in a greater impact in the market, this
analogous to the definition of a security breach in the present research. Similarly, Gatzlaff and
McCullough (2010) found that data breaches had a negative and significant impact on shareholder
wealth. Bharadwaj et al. (2009) found that more severe IT failures lead to a higher negative abnormal
return. These lead to the following hypothesis:
H4: Security breach incidents will result in significantly higher negative abnormal returns than
privacy incidents.
The second hypothesis follows a similar line of thought. It is expected for a firm to become
riskier if it has a security or privacy breach incident. It is also expected for a firm to incur more negative
abnormal returns for security breaches than for privacy breaches. As previously mentioned, the NIST
classified security breaches in the present research, are considered to have a higher level of potential
impact than privacy breaches. Similar changes in risk are found in the finance and accounting areas.
Brennan and Copeland (1988), for example, found evidence of risk change around stock split
announcements. Ball and Kothari (1991) and Patton and Verardo (2009) performed an analysis on beta
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changes as a result of earning announcements, the authors found a statistically significant risk shift as
measured by beta. Nicholas-Donald et al. (2011) found evidence of risk shifts as a result of a privacy
breach. Based on the aforementioned discussion, the following hypothesis is put forward:
H5: Security breach incidents will result in a significantly higher risk increase (as determined by
beta) than privacy incidents.
While abnormal announcement returns and risk shifts reflect a change in the average investors’
beliefs, abnormal volume reflects the difference in the marginal traders’ reactions to a security or privacy
breach announcement. These differences could come from differential interpretation or differential preannouncement beliefs. Regardless, more studies need to be conducted in the area because of trading
volume’s potential to yield new insights on the impact of security and privacy breach areas. Only one
study by Nicholas-Donald et al. (2011), as stated earlier, have been conducted on this topic in the
information systems area. The authors found that trading volume decreased as a result of a privacy
breach. Trading volume is relatively unexplored in capital market research even in the accounting and
finance areas (Bamber et al., 2010). Nevertheless, there are a few studies that examine abnormal trading
volume. Biktimirov et al. (2004) found, for example, a clear and significant evidence of abnormally high
volume for a large sample of publicly traded companies that are added to or deleted from the small cap
Russell 2000 index. Bali and Francis (2010) found evidence of an increase of about 26% on trading
volume, using cumulative standardized excess volume, as a result of capital gains tax rate reductions.
Similarly, Bamber et al. (2010) found trading volume surges as a result of earning announcements.
Therefore, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H6: The security breach incidents will result in a significantly higher abnormal volume than
privacy incidents.
These hypotheses put forward will be tested using a variety empirical analysis. In the next
chapter, the research method and sample selection used in order to test the aforementioned hypotheses
are put forward.
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Chapter 4: Research Method and Sample Selection
This Chapter is also divided into multiple Sections. The first Section (i.e.4.1) explains the
process of collecting the data for this dissertation. This is followed by several Sections explaining each
of the different methods used to test the hypotheses put forward in Chapter 3. Section 4.2 explains how
abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using the one factor market model. Section 4.3
describes an alternate process of calculating abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns using Fama and
French's three factor model. In Section 4.4 the process followed to compute cumulative abnormal
returns is put forward. Section 4.5 illustrates the process followed in order to estimate risk shifts. Lastly,
Chapter 4 concludes the Section in 4.6 by putting forward how abnormal trading volume is calculated.
4.1.

Data Selection
The data for the present dissertation was found by searching the Lexis-Nexis Academic database

for possible security or privacy breaches between the years 1999 and 2009. Major US publications were
selected as the sources of the events. The events were collected using the following search strings to
identify the events: 1) Cybersecurity; 2) Hacker Attack; 3) Information Security (breach or incident); 4)
Computer Security (breach or incident); 5) Network Security (breach or incident); 6) Internet Security
(breach or incident); 7) Privacy (breach or incident); and, 8) Denial of Service.
For a firm to be included in the sample, it is required that financial statement of the firm be
available in the Compustat database, and returns be available in the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) database. The firms were also analyzed for confounding events, such as earning
announcements during the event window. Using the above filters, a sample of 114 security (65) and
privacy (49) breaches was selected in the present dissertation research. The sample consisted of events
that occurred between June 23, 1997 and October 28, 2009. The rest of this chapter describes the
different methodologies employed in order to test the proposed hypotheses.
4.2.

One Factor Market Model
In this Section, the process of estimating abnormal returns using a one factor model is explained.

Abnormal stock returns in this dissertation, is based on a one-factor model and Fama-French's three
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factor model (see Section 4.3) to estimate expected returns. The market model is based on the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Estimation of expected returns uses an ordinary least squares (OLS)
regression where the dependent variable is the return for stock (i) at time (t) and the independent
variable is the market index for the same time (t) (see Equation 1 below).

where, Ri,t is the return for firm i on day t; Rm,t is the return on the market portfolio on day t; ai
and bi are parameters in the model; and, εi,t is the disturbance term.
An estimation period of at least 120 days is required for each entry in the sample,
beginning 251 trading days (a full calendar year) before the event day identified as day 0 (Benninga,
2008). All but 1 of the 33 sample firms used in the present research has a full 250 days of return data
(i.e. [-251, -1]). The CRSP value-weighted index is used as a proxy for the market portfolio. The valueweighted index is weighted by the market capitalization and contains the returns, including all
distributions of a portfolio. Once the regression coefficients are estimated, the expected returns are
subtracted from the observed returns to obtain the abnormal returns (see Equation 2 below):

where, ARi,t is the abnormal return for firm i on day t; Ri,t is the return for firm i on day t; Rm,t is
the return on the market portfolio on day t; and ai and bi are the parameters estimated in the model.
4.3.

Fama-French’s Three-factor Model
An alternative model to the one-factor market model in estimating returns is the Fama-French's

three-factor model. The three-factor model was introduced by Fama and French (1993, 1996). This
model builds from one-factor model and adds two more factors (i.e. firm size and value), hence known
as the three-factor model. This model was introduced with the purpose of developing a methodology that
could better explain returns. Firm size is operationalized by market capitalization and value by the book29

to-market ratio. The Equation (3) is used to estimate expected returns based on Fama and French's threefactor model:

where, Rit is the return for firm i on day t; RFt is the risk-free rate on day t; RMt is the market
return on day t; SMBt is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return
on a portfolio of large stocks on day t (small minus big); HMLt is the difference between the return on a
portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the return of on a portfolio of low-book-to-market stocks on
day t; ai, bi, si, hi are the Fama and French parameters estimated in the three-factor model for firm i; and,
eit is the disturbance term from the regression.
A few studies in the past have used the three-factor by Fama and French (e.g. Goel & Shawky,
2009; Gordon et al., 2011) as a robustness test. The purpose of a robustness test is to explain the same
phenomena with alternative models. The idea is that if the results are similar, then the model should be
robust. Once the expected returns are calculated using the Fama-French's three factor model, abnormal
returns are calculated as explained at the end of Section 4.2. This model was used as a robustness test of
the one-factor market model as also explained in Section 4.2. The following Section explains how
cumulative abnormal returns are calculated.
4.4.

Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Abnormal returns may occur over a multi-day period. This is because of the fact that markets

may not fully absorb information instantaneously, and/or that the event may not be reported
immediately. Cumulative abnormal returns are computed in the following fashion to account for this
phenomenon:

Two variations of CAR, for robustness purposes, are computed. First, CARs are estimated using
the market model. Second, CARs were also calculated using the Fama-French's three factor model. The
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CARs, were also transformed using two techniques, winsorization, and natural log of CAR + 1.
Winsorization is a process of handling extreme observations with the purpose of reducing its possible
effect in the results.
4.5.

Beta Changes (Measure of Risk)
This Section explains the process in estimating the risk incurred as a result of a privacy or a

security breach. Beta changes are used in the finance and accounting literature as a measure of risk shifts
(e.g. (Barberis et al., 2005; Patton & Verardo, 2009; Yun & Kim, 2010)
The calculation of beta changes follows a similar process explained in the Abnormal
Returns Section 4.2. A one-factor model (Equation 1) and the Fama-French's three factor model
(Equation 3) are employed to estimate the firm’s beta both before [-251, -1] and after [1, 251] the event.
Then, the post-event beta is standardized by the pre-event beta (Equation 5), producing a ratio that
should equal one if the event had no impact on the risk of the firm.

4.6.

Abnormal Trading Volume
Finally, abnormal volume is calculated as a third measure of abnormal activity in the firm’s

equity during the event. Abnormal trading volume is calculated as suggested by Yun and Kim (2010) and
Beneish and Whaley (1996). The authors scaled the average event daily volume (see Equation 6) by the
average pre-event (see Equation 7) daily volume (the present research used a 60-day period [-61, -2]). If
trading volume in the event period is normal, the ratio should equal one (see Equation 8). The following
Equations (6-8) were used in order to estimate the trading volume as per Yun and Kim (2010) and
Beneish and Whaley (1996) method:
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Chapter 5: Results
In this Chapter, the results and a discussion of the results is put forward. The results are centered
on the theme of the proposed hypotheses described in Chapter 2. The first Section 5.1 puts forwards the
results pertaining the publicly announced privacy breaches. This is followed by Section 5.2, where the
results related to the publicly announced security breaches are shown. The third and last Section 5.3 of
this Chapter provides a comparative analysis of privacy and security breaches.
5.1.

Results of Publicly Announced Privacy Breaches
Table 1 provides the results for H1a for the present dissertation research. The empirical analysis

of 49 privacy breaches provided an average CAR of +1.22%. This positive abnormal return is
statistically significant at an acceptable p-value. The results shown in Table 1 were calculated using the
one-factor market model.

Table 5.1: The Means Test for Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Privacy Breaches
N

Mean

t-value

Pr > |t|

49

0.0122

1.7404

0.0882

The risk shift was observed by analyzing the changes on pre-and post-betas. A one-factor CAPM
model, as explained by Yun and Kim (2010), was used to calculate pre- and post-betas. Both, the preand post-betas were calculated using the 250 trading days surrounding the event announcement day. The
means test results for the prior-and post-event betas are shown in Table 5.2. The analysis shows that the
risk of firms that experienced a privacy breach has decreased after its announcement. This risk decrease
is observed in the beta ratio (see Equation 5 in Section 4.5), where the expectation for normal trading
volume is a ratio of 1. In this case, the ratio is below 1, indicative of a decrease in risk as measured by
betas.
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Table 5.2: The Means Test for Beta (Privacy Breaches)
N
49
49
49

Mean
1.5790
1.4741
0.8808

t-value
15.1074
16.6022
10.4524

Pr > |t|
<0.01
<0.01
<0.01

Description
Pre-event beta
Post-event beta
Beta ratio

In order to test H2a, the abnormal trading volume experienced by the companies suffering a
privacy related breached firms is analyzed. In the present research, as aforementioned, abnormal trading
volume is calculated based in the work of Beneish and Whaley (1996) and Yun and Kim (2010).
Abnormal trading volume is estimated using Equation 8 in Section 4.6. As previously mentioned, the
average trading volume for the 60 pre-event trading days is compared with the volume of the event
window (i.e. [-1, 1]) for each privacy breached firm. The privacy breached firms experienced a
significant abnormal trading volume of about 7.7% (decrease) during the event window (see Table 5.3).

Table 5.3: Abnormal Trading Volume (Privacy Breaches)
N

Mean

t-stat (p-value)

49

0.9226

14.8882 (<0.01)

Method
Beneish & Whaley, 1996; Yun &
Kim, 2010

In this Section, the results obtained related to privacy breaches were presented. In the following
Section the results related to publicly announced security breaches will be discussed.
5.2.

Results of Publicly Announced Security Breaches
First, the results for the test of Cumulative Abnormal Returns are presented. Second, the results

testing the risk shifts are put forward. The third and the last set of results pertain to the abnormal trading
volume.
In Table 5.4. the results related to H1b are provided. The empirical analysis of 65 security
breaches provided an average CAR of -1.31%. This negative abnormal return has a p-value of 0.1123.
The results shown in Table 4 were calculated using the one-factor market model.
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Table 5.4: The Means Test for Cumulative Abnormal Returns for Security Breaches
N Mean
t-Value Pr > |t|
65 -0.0131 -1.6100 0.1123
The risk shift was observed by analyzing the changes in pre-and post-betas. A one-factor CAPM
model, as explained by Yun and Kim (2010) was used to calculate pre- and post-betas. The test results
for the prior-and post-event betas, and beta ratio are shown in Table 5.5 below. The analysis shows that
the risk of firms that experienced a security breach has significantly increased after its announcement.
This risk increase is observed in the beta ratio (see Equation 5 in Section 4.5), where the expectation for
normal trading volume is a ratio of 1. In this case, the ratio is above 1, indicative of a decrease in risk as
measured by betas due to a security breach.

Table 5.5: The Means Test for Beta (Security Breaches)
N Mean
t-stat Pr > |t| Description
65 1.0476 19.8976 <0.01 Pre-event beta
65 1.0772 18.1182 <0.01 Post-event beta
65 1.1188 11.0369 <0.01 Beta ratio
In order to test H2b, the abnormal trading volume experienced by the companies suffering a
security related breached firms are analyzed. In order to estimate abnormal trading volume, the method
of Beneish & Whaley (1996) and Yun and Kim (20120) was used (see Equation 8 in Section 4.6). As
previously mentioned, the average trading volume for the 60 pre-event trading days is compared with
the volume of the event window (i.e. [-1, 0, +1]) for each security breached firm. Using this technique,
the security breached firms observed a statistically significant abnormal trading volume of about 1.1%
increase in volume during the event window (see Table 5.6).

Table 5.6: Abnormal Trading Volume (Security Breaches)
N

Mean

t-stat (p-value)

65

1.0109

16.5158 (<0.01)

Method
Beneish & Whaley, 1996; Yun &
Kim, 2010

35

In this Section the analyses of publicly announced security breaches are put forward. The
analyses followed the theme of the hypotheses. In the following Section a comparative analysis of
privacy and security breaches are put forward.
5.3.

Comparative Results of Privacy and Security Breaches
In this Section, the comparative results of privacy and security breaches are put forward. Table

5.7 shows that the average cumulative abnormal return for the entire sample is -0.23% (for the three-day
[-1, 1]). Similarly, the ratio of the post-event beta over the pre-event beta, for the entire sample, was
1.02. Both abnormal volume measures (mean CSEV = -0.14 and Volume Change Ratio = 0.97) indicate
that trading volume around the event is below normal.

Table 5.7: Descriptive Statistics
Variable

N Mean Median Std. Dev

Cumulative abnormal return (CAR)

114 -0.0023 0.0040 0.0601

Beta change ratio

114 1.0170 0.9568 0.7349

Cumulative standardized excess volume (CSEV) 114 -0.1446 -0.9480 4.5312
Volume change ratio

114 0.9730 0.9009 0.4688

In Table 5.8 the sample is bifurcated based on whether the event was a security breach or a
privacy breach. Panel A shows the mean cumulative abnormal returns. On average, firms experiencing a
security breach had a -1.31% CAR while firms that had a privacy breach had a 1.22% increase in CAR.
The difference of the CAR averages between the two types of breaches is statistically significant,
supporting H1. The results are quantitatively similar when winsorising and log transformation of the
data are performed.
The ratio of post-event over pre-event beta is presented in Panel B. The security breach sample
has a ratio of 1.12, which is statistically different from the null of 1. The privacy breach group mean
ratio is 0.88. The difference between the security and privacy group ratios is statistically significant, at
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the 7% level. Clearly it appears that the security group firms suffered an increase in risk and this
increased risk is significantly higher than the privacy group. This increase seems to be persistent for the
250 days following the event, as indicated by the beta change ratio. An increase in beta can have a
serious impact on the firm’s cost of capital and thus lead to lower profitability in the future.

Table 5.8: Comparative Analysis of Study Variables
N Mean t-stat (p-value)
Panel A: Cumulative Abnormal Returns [-1, 1]
i) Security Breaches 65 -0.0131 -1.61 (0.11)
ii) Privacy Breaches 49 0.0122 1.74 (0.09)
Mean (i) = mean (ii): t-stat = 2.36, p-value = 0.02
Panel B: Beta Change Ratio
i) Security Breaches 65 1.1188 11.04 (<0.01)
ii) Privacy Breaches 49 0.8808 10.45 (<0.01 )
Mean (i) = mean (ii): t-stat = -1.81 p-value < 0.07
Panel C: Volume Change Ratio
i) Security Breaches 65 1.0110 16.52 (<0.01)
ii) Privacy Breaches 49 0.9226 14.89 (<0.01)
Mean (i) = mean (ii): t-stat = -1.01 p-value = 0.31
Panel C present the abnormal volume measures for each type of event. The ratio of the average
daily event volume over the average daily pre-event volume is 1.01 and 0.92 for security and privacy
breaches, respectively. This measure suggests that privacy events result in significantly less daily
volume. Similar results were obtained when cumulative abnormal returns are calculated using Fama and
French's three factor model.
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Chapter 6: Discussion and Conclusion
In this Section, the discussion and conclusions of the present research are put forward. This
Section is divided in two parts. First, Section 6.1 provides a discussion of the findings. Second, a
conclusion of present dissertation research is presented in Section 6.2.
6.1.

Discussion
Previous studies attempted to explain the impact of information privacy and security breaches.

The results were mixed and there was no definite consensus on whether privacy and security incidents
had significant impacted a firm value as measured by its stock prices. In addition, no comparative
analysis of privacy and security breaches was conducted. The present dissertation research defines
privacy and security breaches using NIST standard. This lessens the ambiguity in the area. In addition, a
comparative analysis of privacy and security breaches was undertaken. In this Section, the results from
the present research are compared and contrasted to the findings of previous studies.
The present research finds a positive and significant (p=.09) cumulative abnormal returns on the
firm value for privacy breaches and, therefore it failed to support H1a. This is in line with studies by
Hovav and D'Arcy (2003; 2004) and Ishiguro et al. (2006) who find similar results. This also means that
the present research contradicts a number of recent studies (Acquisti et al. (2006), Khansa and Liginlal
(2011), and Nicholas-Donald et al. (2011)) that find negative impact on the firm value as a result of a
privacy breach. Overall, this may be indicative that investors do not perceive a significant increase in
firm risk due to a privacy breach.
In the area of security breaches, the present research find that the security breaches result in a
negative but not at a highly significant level. The present research, therefore, moderately supports H1b
(p-value of 0.11). Some of the recent research studies found a statistical significant relationship between
security breaches and firm value (Bose & Leung, 2008; Chen et al., 2011; Gatzlaff & McCullough,
2010; Goel & Shawky, 2009; Gordon et al., 2011; and Malhotra & Malhotra, 2011; Morse et al., 2011).
The risk shift for the privacy breaches (H2a) were tested, as stated earlier, by analyzing the
changes on pre- and post-betas. The analysis for the privacy group shows the risk of firms that
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experienced a privacy breach has decreased significantly after its announcement. Once again, this may
be an indicative that investors do not perceive a significant increase in firm risk due to a privacy breach.
These results are not aligned with the findings of Nicholas-Donald et al. (2011), where an increase in
risk was observed. It is important to mention here that the authors, however, did not test if this risk shift
was statistically significant. No other studies in the area of Information Systems analyzed risk shifts as a
result of a privacy breach. In the finance and accounting areas, however, risk shifts were analyzed in
different contexts. Risks shifts, for example, were calculated when a firm's stock is added to a market
index (e.g. (Barberis et al., 2005; Yun & Kim, 2010) and when firms issue convertible debt on
systematic equity risk (Kleidt & Schiereck, 2009). Both studies found a significant risk increase for the
events the authors scrutinized.
In the area of security breaches, the test results show that post-event betas has increased but this
increase is not significant (H2b). The present dissertation research is the first empirical study in the
information systems area that analyzed the risk shifts due to security breaches. No comparisons can,
therefore, be made with other studies in the aforementioned area. Similar findings were, however,
observed in the finance area. A study by Amihud, DeLong, and Saunders (2002), for example, found no
significant increase or decrease in risk for the acquirers when the authors examined the effects of crossborder bank mergers. The expectation was to observe a risk shift for the acquirers. The study by Howe
and Madura (1990) is another example where risk shifts were expected and not observed. In this study,
the authors analyzed the risk shifts due to international listings of stocks.
Another important contribution of the present research lies in analyzing the significant impact of
privacy breaches on abnormal trading volume (H3a). The present research found support to the
hypothesis that privacy breaches resulted in significant abnormal trading volume. The results of the
present research agree with the findings of Nicholas-Donald et al. (2011) who found abnormal trading
volume as a consequence of a privacy breach. The present research, therefore, support H3a. This
phenomenon has been previously studied in the areas of accounting and finance. Studies in these areas
have found abnormal trading value as a result of earnings announcements (e.g. Bamber et al., 2010;
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Frazzini & Lamont, 2007), capital gains tax rate reductions (e.g. Bali & Francis, 2010), additions to
stock indexes (e.g. Biktimirov et al., 2004; Joseph et al., 2011), among others.
Abnormal trading volume with regard to security breaches (H3b) in the present research has
increased by 1.1% (p-value < .01). In the area of information security breaches, the present research is
the first in testing abnormal trading volume due to a security incident. In the areas of finance and
accounting, studies have, however, observed abnormal trading volume as a result of various events.
Abnormal trading volume, for example, was detected around capital gains tax rate reduction
announcements (Bali & Francis, 2010), around earning announcements (Bamber et al., 2010; Hope et
al., 2009), and approximately close to national elections (Bialkowski et al., 2008).
The present research also sheds light in establishing that there are differences between how the
market reacts differently to security and privacy breaches. As previously mentioned, the comparison
takes into consideration three different aspects: abnormal returns, risk shifts, and abnormal trading
volume. These are discussed next.
Hypothesis 4 posits that security breaches will result in significantly higher abnormal returns
compared to privacy breaches. This hypothesis is supported in the present research. The results allows
me to go one step further and say that cumulative abnormal returns for the security group are also
significantly higher than the privacy group. This means the present research is able to agree with Garg et
al. (2003a, 2003b, 2003c) when they stated that security breaches have the highest negative impact. The
present research is the first of its kind in comparing the impact of security and privacy breaches on
abnormal returns.
The second hypothesis comparing the two previously defined, security and privacy breaches is
related to risk shifts (H5). These risk shifts occur for both, privacy and security breaches. Security
breaches, as previously discussed, resulted in a significant increase in risk whereas privacy breaches
caused a decrease in risk. This supports H5, indicating that security breaches result in significantly
higher firm risk than privacy breaches. This means that the market differentiates between the two types
of breaches. No previous study has observed and explained this market behavior.
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The last hypothesis that compares privacy and security breaches is H6. This hypothesis posits
that security breaches will result in significantly higher abnormal trading volume. This hypothesis is not
supported. Both, security and privacy breaches resulted in abnormal trading volume. There is no
significant difference, however, in how the market reacted between the two groups. Therefore, H6 is not
supported. Since the present research is the first of its kind, I am unable to compare it with other
research studies.
6.2.

Recommendations for Future Research
An opportunity for future research, as previously mentioned, is to collect a bigger sample and

retest the hypotheses. Another possible venue for future research lies in dividing the sample into time
periods. These time periods could be dictated by important events that may have contributed on how
investors react to security and privacy breaches. These events may be, for example, the 9/11 tragedy, the
dot-com bubble, among others. An additional venue for future research is to investigate the impact of
firm characteristics on abnormal trading volume. Some of these characteristics, for example, could be
firm size, industry, and traditional versus net-firms, among others. The firm characteristics may play a
role in diminishing or enhancing the effect of security and privacy breaches on the stock market
behavior.
The present dissertation research will be divided in three different articles for publication. The
first essay is an empirical analysis of privacy breaches. The economic impact of privacy breaches essay
will be submitted to an information systems conference and to an academic journal for publication. The
second essay consists of an empirical analysis of security breaches. A portion of this second essay has
been already presented and published in the proceedings of the 2012 Americas Conference on
Information Systems. This second essay will be improved and submitted to an academic journal for
publication. The third essay is a comparative analysis of security and privacy breaches. Similarly to the
aforementioned two essays, this essay will also be submitted to an information systems conference and
to an academic journal for publication.
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6.3.

Conclusion
In this Section, the concluding remarks of the present research are put forward. Firstly, the

conclusions related to the first three hypotheses are put forward. The first three hypotheses analyzed the
privacy and security breaches as separate groups. Secondly, the conclusions for hypotheses 4 to 6 are put
forward. These last set of hypotheses established the differences between privacy and security breaches.
Thirdly, an explanation of how the present research advanced the areas of information security and
privacy is presented. Lastly, some of the limitations of the present research are explained.
Taken together, abnormal returns and risk shifts, investors did not penalize firms for suffering a
privacy breach. The fact that privacy breaches resulted in abnormal trading volume is not indicative of a
negative market reaction. Abnormal trading volume has to be taken into consideration in combination
with abnormal returns, which in this case are not significantly negative. Firms that suffered a publicly
announced security breach, on the other hand, were penalized by investors. The fact that security
breaches resulted in abnormal trading volume and negative abnormal returns, is an indication that the
market penalize firms suffering such breaches. The observed increase in risk, also, supports the
hypotheses that investors perceived firms that suffer a security breach to be more risky. Again, it is
believed that the present research results are the first in establishing this effect on abnormal returns, risk
shifts, and abnormal trading volume in the information privacy and security area.
The present research goes one step further and conducts a comparative study between security
and privacy breaches in these three measures. Taken together, the tests indicate that security breaches
appear to have a greater impact on a firm’s stock price, riskiness of the firm, as well as its trading
volume. Negative abnormal returns were significantly higher for those firms suffering a security breach.
This result is indicative that indeed, security breaches are more severe than privacy breaches in terms of
abnormal returns. In particular, an important finding of the present research is that the riskiness of the
firm (as measured by its beta) is significantly higher for firms that suffered a security breach than those
that suffered a privacy breach. Around the event announcement, however, there is no indication that
abnormal trading volume is higher for security breaches than privacy breaches. This is an indication that
the market does not react differently to security and privacy breaches, in terms of the volume selling and
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buying stocks. Taken the results separately, however, the market does react differently for security and
privacy breaches.
The present research advances the area of information systems privacy and security. These
advances are in the context of sample size and statistical methods used to test the proposed hypotheses.
Similar studies in the area of information systems security and privacy used an average sample size of
around 85 events. The present research consisted of a sample of 114 events. In the context of statistical
methods, the present research calculated abnormal returns using two alternative models, the market
model and the Fama-French's model. The use of two models to calculate abnormal returns increased the
robustness of the results. The present research, also, used an estimation window of 250 trading days to
calculate abnormal returns. Previous research studies were inconsistent with the use of estimation
windows, however, most of the studies relied in a estimation window of 120 days. A longer estimation
window provides a more accurate calculation of expected returns.
The present research also has some limitations. The sample size, although it is higher
than the average used in prior studies, is still small compared to studies conducted in the areas of finance
and accounting. The sample size, therefore, is still a limitation of the present research. A second
limitation of the present research is that only public companies are analyzed. Public companies are used
because the data used is only available for public companies. Again, this is a limitation for all event
studies. Another limitation of any event study is that privacy and security breaches must be publicly
announced. In this capacity, it is well known that firms are not always as forthcoming in announcing
security and privacy breaches. This is in part attributed to the fact that the Security and Exchange
Commission does not require firms to disclose these breaches. Firms that suffered a security or privacy
breach, also, may not disclose the breaches in order to preserve their reputation. It is very likely,
therefore, that there are undisclosed privacy and security breaches that were not included in the sample
used for the present research.
The present seminal research, in summary, contributes to the information privacy and security
breach areas in a number of ways: first, it clearly distinguishes between the security and privacy
breaches following the guidelines suggested in the literature, establishing clearly defined privacy and
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security groups. Second, the results show that, on average, publicly traded companies experiencing a
security breach had significantly higher negative cumulative abnormal returns than those companies that
suffered a privacy breach incidents. Third, the results show that the firms in the security breach group
experienced a significant increase in risk during the year after the breach. This risk is also significantly
higher for the security breach. The present research is the first in conducting abnormal trading volume
and abnormal risk analyses in the information privacy and security area. By completing the
aforementioned, the present research moved forward the literature in the areas of information security
and privacy breaches.
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